By William Starbuck, Moshe Farjoun
The e-book bargains very important perception suitable to company, govt and international organisations administration commonly. The across the world recognized authors take on important matters in choice making, how organizational threat is controlled, how can technological and organizational complexities have interaction, what are the impediments for potent studying and the way huge, medium, and small agencies can, and in reality needs to, bring up their resilience. Managers, organizational specialists, specialist execs, and coaching experts; quite these in excessive threat corporations, could locate the problems lined within the booklet proper to their day-by-day paintings and a possible catalyst for suggestion and motion.
- A well timed research of the Columbia catastrophe and the organizational classes that may be realized from it.
- Includes contributions from these excited by the research Board document into the incident.
- Tackles very important concerns resembling the position of time pressures and objective clash in determination making, and the impediments for potent learning.
- Examines how organizational threat is controlled and the way technological and organizational complexities interact.
- Assesses how huge, medium, and small corporations can, and in reality needs to, bring up their resilience.
- Questions our eagerness to embody new applied sciences, but reluctance to simply accept the dangers of innovation.
- Offers a step-by-step knowing of the complicated components that ended in disaster.
Read or Download Organization at the limit : lessons from the Columbia disaster PDF
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Extra resources for Organization at the limit : lessons from the Columbia disaster
A longerterm consequence, the compromised technological design of the shuttle, is still in effect. As succinctly explained in the CAIB report (chapter 1): In retrospect, the increased complexity of a shuttle, designed to be all things to all people created inherited greater risks than if a more realistic technological goal had been set at the start. Designing a reusable spacecraft that is also cost effective is a daunting engineering challenge; doing so on a tightly constrained budget is even more difficult.
102), a trend that continued throughout the next three decades. With Apollo’s success, there was a lessened sense of urgency for space exploration. NASA had to find new challenges that could inspire in a way similar to the Apollo programs in order to justify continued funding. The new vision, the related policy, and the technological decisions negotiated and drafted in the 1970–2 period placed the space shuttle program on a long-term trajectory that culminated in the Columbia disaster and will continue to affect NASA for years OATC02 23 06/14/2005, 10:51 AM 24 Farjoun to come.
They were born as NASA strove for survival, but they have had lasting and unintended consequences. Despite subsequent upgrades, the technological design of the shuttle has embodied less safety than intended from the beginning. Moreover, a by-product of the shuttle’s economic and operational rationale sold to politicians promising as many flights a year as were needed created a public expectation outside NASA and a cultural myth within NASA that it could indeed operate the shuttle in a reliable and routine mode.