By Henry Morgenthau
The booklet Germany is Our challenge was once released via Harper and Brothers in October 1945.
In the booklet Morgenthau defined his plan and the reason for it in nice element.
President Roosevelt had granted permission for the ebook of the publication the night
before his dying, whilst eating with Morgenthau at hot Springs.
In November 1945 basic Dwight D. Eisenhower, the army Governor of the U.S.
Occupation region, licensed the distribution of one thousand loose copies of the ebook to American
military officers in occupied Germany. Historian Stephen Ambrose attracts the belief
that, regardless of Eisenhower's later claims that the act used to be now not an endorsement of the
Morgenthau plan, Eisenhower either licensed of the plan and had formerly given
Morgenthau not less than a few of his rules on how Germany could be handled.
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Extra info for Germany is our problem
By 1939 war preparations had sent German heavy industry's employment up by 133 per cent. The rest of German industry employed 70 per cent more workers. These remaining industries will give Germany what she needs to support her people and even to export in order to buy essentials she cannot produce herself—or essentials which she will not be allowed to produce such as machinery, transportation equipment and the like. Her share in world trade will be smaller than it used to be, but then it had been on the decline for a great many years.
But it will be possible to check the importation of scientific equipment, without which their work will be extremely slow if not impossible. It will be possible to deprive them of their organized centers of research, which will make it difficult for them to gain the benefit of each other's experiments. There will remain to Germany her medical laboratories and the like. They will not be a substitute for the research once carried out in the Reich. The result may well be that the world will have to wait for a few discoveries of benefit to its health and well-being until they are made by non-Germans.
After all, the avowed object of any reparations program is to rebuild the devastated areas for whose ruin Germany is responsible. The best way to do that lies through three main routes, all of which would be locked rather than opened by a system of reparations paid in industrial products. The three may be summed up as: 1. The largest possible immediate assistance to the liberated countries. This means, besides whatever help can be given by the other United Nations, all the useful machinery, raw materials and labor that can be found in Germany.