By L. Lambertini
The interaction among corporations’ inner association and industry behaviour is a protracted status factor in commercial economics. This book examines companies’ goals within the relatively new standpoint formed by way of globalization. The confident and normative facets of theoretical research are built and richly complemented via empirical stories.
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Additional info for Firms' Objectives and Internal Organisation in a Global Economy: Positive and Normative Analysis (Central Issues in Contemporary Economic Theory and Policy)
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Z. The result5 can be summed up in: 3 With V1 and market uncertainty expected profits PROPOSITION are higher with quantity setting rather than with price setting. PROOF With price setting the FOC is: Then, the optimal quantity is: g" = Al[2 ( 1 (24) + d)] + e Expected profit is: (25) ExVIp= ~ ~ / [ 4+( d1) ] - ~ e ~ d With quantity setting we get: Substituting g, in the demand function we get: while equilibrium profit is: (28) %Q - [A(A + 2e)]/[4(1+ d ) ] whose expected value is: (29) ExmQ = ~ ~ / [ 4+( d1) ] This result closely replicates KLEMPERER P.
Demand structure is the same as above. As far as technologies are concerned we consider the simple case of linear settings. Finally, outside options are assumed equal to zero. In this framework we are able to derive a novel result contained in the following: 4 With bargaining along the vertical chain, PROPOSITION market uncertainty and symmetric baldness, quantity setting and price setting give rise to the same aggregate level of expected profits along the vertical chain. Under P setting the distribution of profits along the vertical chain is symmetric.