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By Todd A. Eisenstadt

Pitting competition activists' post-electoral conflicts opposed to their utilization of regime-constructed electoral courts, this examine of Mexico's sluggish transition to democracy addresses the puzzle of why its competition events did not use those independent courts. The electoral courts have been verified to mitigate Mexico's frequently violent post-electoral disputes at key moments of the country's 27-year democratic transition, and had formal promises of courtroom independence from the celebration of the Institutional Revolution (PRI).

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Sample text

1978, Lamounier 1989, Liu 1991), I model authoritarian “precurtain” decisions to hold elections and modify electoral institutions as the result both of shifts in support within the authoritarian’s internal coalition and of pressure by actors outside this authoritarian coalition. Unlike most previous studies, I emphasize opposition-authoritarian bargaining and the electoral arena, arguing in Chapter 2 that this is a defining characteristic of protracted transitions. beyond “the opposition” as unitary actors: parties, movements, and party-movements For most Third Wave transitions, particularly those where regimes toppled decisively and were replaced with comparable drama, bargaining between state and opposition political parties was a secondary mechanism.

Not surprisingly, Hypotheses 3 and 4 were mostly confirmed for both the PAN and the PRD. However, novel results were obtained from my multinomial logit models, reported in Chapter 5, regarding Hypotheses 1 and 2. The most important empirical finding of the whole study was that both PRD and PAN behaviors disconfirmed Hypothesis 1, that strong electoral institutions encourage postelectoral compliance. For the PRD in particular, the opposite relationship held; party activists were more likely to mobilize after elections in states with electoral institutions that – on paper at least – were more autonomous of the executive branch, than in states with weak formal institutions.

0521820014c01 0 521 82001 4 August 1, 2003 Electoral Courts and Actor Compliance 12:0 27 2. Patronage seeking: Opposition parties willing to play by authoritarian rules, with the eventual but distant objective of liberalizing the electoral system, in the meantime obtaining offices, public financing, and other resources in exchange for loyally “fronting” opposition candidates to make the regime look competitive. 3. Antiregime: Hard-line opposition that refuses to even participate in authoritarian institutions and seeks instead to undermine them, usually through protest mobilizations.

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