Download Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: A New by Stacey B. Gordon PDF

  • admin
  • April 20, 2017
  • Elections
  • Comments Off on Download Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: A New by Stacey B. Gordon PDF

By Stacey B. Gordon

This ebook stories the present paradox in the vote casting literature on crusade contributions and legislative vote casting habit. particularly, whereas newshounds and observers think that the contributions considerably impression congressional votes, empirical proof compiled through political scientists has regularly did not determine a scientific linkage among the 2. while, the amount of cash contributed by way of curiosity teams is expanding and polls point out that the general public is changing into extra cynical concerning the technique.

Show description

Read or Download Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: A New Approach PDF

Similar elections books

Political Polling: Strategic Information in Campaigns

Expert pollster Jeffrey M. Stonecash combines 17 years of sensible polling adventure with educational concept to teach how and why polling is completed and what the easiest techniques are to profitable elections.

Cracked but Not Shattered: Hillary Rodham Clinton's Unsuccessful Campaign for the Presidency

Cracked yet now not Shattered completely analyzes Hillary Clinton's 2008 crusade for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination with an eye fixed to opting for what went wrong-why, the frontrunner, she ended up no longer breaking _the glass ceiling. _ even if her conversation was once incorrect and the media assurance of her did mirror biases, those essays show how her crusade used to be in hassle from the beginning due to her gender, prestige as a former First woman, and being 1/2 a political couple.

Evaluation and Optimization of Electoral Systems (Monographs on Discrete Mathematics and Applications)

This monograph deals a scientific quantitative method of the research, assessment, and layout of electoral platforms. this present day, electoral reform is of outrage to baby democracies in addition to many elderly ones. The authors use mathematical versions and automated approaches, whilst attainable, to resolve many of the difficulties that come up within the comparability of current structures in addition to within the building of recent ones.

Social Structure and Voting in the United States

This booklet analyzes useful and ethical affects on vote casting judgements. Undermining the frequent assumption that fiscal self-interest is the major determinant of balloting offerings, it discovers that ethical concerns rooted in non secular traditions are frequently the extra decisive. This discovering is proven via a detailed research of exact difficulties, comparable to baby overlook and crime, difficulties which one could anticipate to hassle functional electorate.

Additional info for Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: A New Approach

Sample text

That campaign donors often provide new Campaign contributions and legislative voting 28 legislators with substantial contributions immediately after they are first elected to office would be consistent with this understanding of donations as gifts (Gordon 2003). Third, the literature on gift giving emphasizes the conflicts created when a potential recipient refuses a gift. This is considered in many societies and circumstances to be unacceptable behavior. “To refuse to give, to fail to invite, just as to refuse to accept, is tantamount to declaring war; it is to reject the bond of alliance and commonality” (Mauss 1923 [1990]).

Neither those votes that are of low value to the group nor those votes that are of high cost to the legislator should be affected. I discuss each below. 1 Votes with Low Cost to Legislators—Low Visibility Issues. One of the reasons there is such a strong and consistent relationship between contributions and behaviors like access and effort is because of the low visibility of these behaviors. They are relatively easy to give in exchange for the gift of a contribution because they are not as potentially costly as votes; they are not as visible or as concrete and therefore are more easily explained away if constituents are unhappy.

FEC 2003). But, although this makes sense in the legal arena, in a theoretical context, it does not. 2 Assumption 2—Contributions Should Influence a Large Number of Votes The second expectation is that if contributions successfully influence votes in a quid pro quo exchange, they will influence a large number of votes or at least influence voting more often than not. Although no individual specifically states that this is the case, the assumption becomes obvious when studying the language used in this literature.

Download PDF sample

Rated 4.20 of 5 – based on 7 votes